Page 1 of 81 Editors Nikita Moreira, Michael Derderian, Ashley Bissonnette Page 2 of 81 Table of Contents Battlefield Studies Archaeology of Modern Conflict: The War after the War in Lithuania and Battle of Užpelkiai Forest, 1949 Gediminas Petrauskas, Aistė Petrauskienė, Vykintas Vaitkevičius………………......................................................................4 The Methodology Used to Identify the Battle Site of Fulford Chas Jones………………………………………………………………………..20 The Battle of Alcalá La Vieja. Location and Understanding of a Medieval Battle. Mario Ramírez Galán, Rafael Montalvo Laguna and María Benítez Galán………………………………………………………...27 Initial Discussions on Military Archaeology Zhao Congcang…………………………………………………………………..45 The Battle of Cheriton: The Archaeology of an English Civil War Battlefield Kevin M. Claxton………………………………………………………………...51 American Revolutionary War “Running the Gauntlet: Locating the Battle of Parker’s Ferry, South Carolina” Steven D. Smith, James B. Legg, Brian C. Mabelitini…………………………..66 Page 3 of 81 The Battle of Cheriton: The Archaeology of an English Civil War Battlefield Kevin M. Claxton1 1. Battlefield’s Trust’s Yorkshire Region INTRODUCION On 29 March 1644, the Battle of Cheriton became a turning point in the English Civil War, marking a significant victory for the Parliamentarians and forcing the Royalists on the defensive for the rest of the war (Burne 1950, 395; Adair 1969, 150; Adair 1973, xiii; Spring 1997, 1; Bonsall 2007, 32; Wanklyn 2014, 83). The battle took place next to the village of Cheriton, approximately 10 km east of the city of Winchester (Figure 1). The battlefield itself lies relatively unchanged since the 17th century yet has not been studied in great detail from either a historical or archaeological perspective. However, between 1974 and the late 1990s, James McGovern and his son Michael metal-detected the fields around Cheriton, collecting various metal objects from different periods, including a large number of lead shot from the battlefield area. When James and Michael both passed away, their collection was donated to the Winchester Museum Services. Whilst a brief study has been carried out on some of the finds from the battlefield site, this accounts for less than 3% of the area of the battlefield (Bonsall 2007, 29). Since then the collection has remained in storage, along with the detectorists’ notes, but until now has yet to be studied in detail (Foard 2012, 191; personal communication, April 9, 2016; Rees, personal communication, April 15, 2016). The Battle of Cheriton Throughout most of the autumn of 1643 and the early months of 1644, Royalist and Parliamentarian forces struggled for control over southern England (Halsall 2002, 45). By the middle of March 1644, Lord Hopton, supported by the Earl of Forth, commanded a Royalist army of between 6,000 and 8,000 men (Burne 1950, 395; Rogers 1968, 120; Seymour 1975, 70; Wanklyn 2014, 83). Standing between the Royalists and the route to London was a Parliamentarian army of between 8,000 and 10,000 men (Burne 1950, 395; Kinross 1979, 111; Wanklyn 2014, 84), led by Hopton’s former friend and comrade-in-arms, Sir Figure 9. Location of the Cheriton William Waller (Adair 1973, 1-2). Accounts of the battle vary, but most follow the description of the action given by Adair (1969, 140battlefield (after Bonsall 2007, 30) 148; 1973, 125-136) (Figures 2 and 3). At the start of the day Hopton had taken up position on the North Ridge (or the Central Ridge in Adair’s interpretation), and early in the battle his forces had successfully defended the strategic Cheriton Wood from the Parliamentarian attacks. Then followed a breakdown in communication and discipline in the Royalist army: a young cavalry officer broke ranks and led a cavalry charge against the Parliamentarian line. What spurred this sudden charge is not known, but it prompted several more Royalist cavalry charges to follow, all of which were defeated by the Parliamentarians. With the Royalist cavalry all but decimated, the Page 51 of 81 Parliamentarians mounted a counter attack, breaking the Royalist line and forcing the King’s army to retreat north to Alresford. Figure 10. Aerial view of the battlefield today showing the current registered area (after Battlefields Trust 2016), the traditional area of the battle (after Burne 1050, 398; Battlefields Trust 2016), the alternative area proposed by Adair (after Adair 1973, plate 18), and the area surveyed in 2007 (after Bonsall 2007). The map also shows the areas of high ground and the battle monument (created by author). Page 52 of 81 Figure 11. Map of the battlefield showing the traditional deployments of the Royalist and Parliamentarian armies (after Burne 1950, 398; Battlefields Trust 2016), and the alternative deployments suggested by Adair (after Adair 1973, plate 18). The map also highlights Bramdean Lane, commonly thought to be the route of the ill-fated Royalist cavalry charge (after Burne 1950, 398; Adair 1969, 140-148; 1973, 125-136; Battlefields Trust 2016) (created by author) The battle was the first significant Parliamentarian victory during the war, forcing Charles I on the defensive for the rest of the Southern campaign (Burne 1950, 395; Adair 1969, 150; 1973, xiii; Spring 1997, 1; Rayner 2004, 93; Bonsall 2007, 32; Wanklyn 2014, 83). The King’s secretary said of the battle, ‘Cheriton was a very doleful beginning to into the year 1644 and broke all the measures, and altered the whole scheme of the King’s Counsels’ (quoted in Emberton 1995, 103). Emberton also describes the significance of the battle, stating that if the Royalists had been victorious and had appeared before the capital ‘there was every reason that the peace party within the government would force the others to sue for terms’ (1995, 102). The ideological result of the battle cannot be underestimated either; a victory for the Parliamentarians proved that God was no longer on the side of the King, lending greater support to the Parliamentarian cause. However, despite being one of the key conflicts of the Civil War, the Battle of Cheriton has not received the literary coverage one might expect. Much of the literature pertaining to the battles of the Civil War gives Cheriton only brief attention; in A. H. Burne’s seminal guide The Battlefields of England acknowledges that ‘this battle is unduly neglected and underrated’ (1950, 395). Similar patterns can be found in other material relating to battlefields around Britain or the Civil War, all providing only brief descriptions of the battle and failing to recognise the significance of the Parliamentarian victory (Rogers 1968, 119-123; Seymour 1975, 68-82; Kinross 1979, 111-112; Smurthwaite 1984, 152-153; Bennett 1990, 100-101; 1997, 208; Ackroyd 2014, 269; Wanklyn 2014, 83-106). Page 53 of 81 Only three complete works dedicated to the study of the Battle of Cheriton have been written: two historical accounts by Adair (1973) and Spring (1997); and the archaeological report by Bonsall (2007) on the assemblage found in one small area of the battlefield (highlighted in Figure 2). Adair also provides a theory for the location of the battle site, proposing what was, at the time, a new site for the battle (1969, 141; 1973, 195197) which conflicted with Burne, who claimed there to be ‘no dispute as to the site of this battle’ (Burne 1950, 397). Spring tentatively adopts Adair’s new suggested location for the site, although he does highlight that there could be some sources Adair has overlooked that may call into question the interpretation of the site (1997, 1). The analysis carried out on a selection of finds from the Dark Copse Field at Cheriton by James Bonsall in 2007 is the first and, until now, the only archaeological research carried out on the battle. The results of the report call into question some of the historical analysis of the site: the analysis proved that some of the action took place further north than the previously accepted location of the battlefield provided by Adair. Bonsall’s report is a prime example of how battlefield archaeology can influence the understanding of battles. However, the report only covers a very small percentage of the assemblage from the site, meaning that a full analysis of the assemblage could provide a much-needed interpretation of the details and precise location of the battle. Although the assemblage was collected by an amateur metal-detector over a long period and is unlikely to be systematic, the survey appears to have covered the entire area of the battlefield, unlike at Edgehill, and differs from Naseby and Marston Moor in that the complete assemblage is available for analysis. Analysis of the Cheriton Collection To gain detailed information about the Battle of Cheriton, an analysis of the small finds assemblage was carried out. This analysis followed similar studies carried out on battlefields in Britain and America, using a methodology appropriate to the assemblage. The aims and objectives of this study also contributed to the methodology used. In addition to the small find analysis a study was made of the collection of notes and maps made by the metal-detectorists who recovered the finds. Methodology and Analysis of the Lead Artefacts The methodology used in the analysis was taken from a variety of similar sources of lead shot study from Britain and America (Bonsall 2007; Foard 2009a; 2009b; 2012; Harding 2012; Sivilich 1996; 2005; 2016). The planned methodology was to incorporate the recording primarily of the type, weight and diameter of each lead shot for the purpose of the research aims but also for any additional information that could be recorded about each artefact, should the need arise for additional information in future studies. To mitigate the health and safety risks of working with lead objects, the analysis was carried out in a ventilated room and gloves, face mask, and a lab coat were worn at all times when working with the collection. The first stage in the analysis was to identify and separate the Civil War finds from the rest of the McGovern collection and to organise them in such an order that could enable easy identification and storage, both during the analysis and in the future. Due to the size of the collection and the timescale in which to analysis it, the decision was taken to focus solely on the lead artefacts and disregard the non-lead finds which could relate to the Civil War that were found in the area, including iron and bone artefacts. Each individual shot was identified by type, weighed using digital scales accurate to 0.01g and studied for any distinguishing marks. Where a mould seam was visible on the shot, the diameter was measured at 90 degrees to the mould line using digital callipers accurate to 0.01mm. Each shot was examined for signs of a sprue cut or flashing, firing evidence, or impact damage. Additional characteristics were also recorded, such as the presence of ramrod marks or evidence of chewing by livestock. The lead shot was then bagged and labelled with an identifying number relating to the field it was recovered from and filed in a cardboard box, and each box shelved in alphabetical order by field name. All information on each lead artefact was recorded directly onto an Excel spread sheet. The ArcMap 10.4.1 GIS program was used alongside EDINA Digimaps and Google Earth for creating the various maps. Page 54 of 81 A total of 2,940 lead finds with a combined weight of nearly 74kg were analysed over the two-week period. Of the 2,940 lead finds, 2893 were some form projectile used Table 1: Breakdown of all lead in gunpowder weapons. The remaining 47 lead objects were powder box caps and priming flask caps. A breakdown of the number of lead artefacts from Cheriton assemblage finds is shown in Table 1. Using the examples provided by Foard (2009b; 2012), Harding (2012), and Sivilich (2005; 2016), a graph was produced to show the different calibre balls analysed in the survey (Figure 4) and the probable weapon types that those shot were produced for. As the graph clearly shows, there are four peaks for the four different weapon types. This reflects similar patterns found in the analysis of other Civil War collections, such as Edgehill (Foard 2012, 54-57; 69). These numbers are also able to determine the split between infantry and cavalry at the battle, as the muskets would have been used by infantry and the cavalry would use carbines and pistols. Table 2 shows the number of balls per weapon type and therefore whether the ball is likely to represent cavalry or infantry. Although it is impossible to determine whether the ball belonged to the Royalists or the Parliamentarians, these figures suggest that approximately one-third of the armies at the Battle of Cheriton were made up of cavalry. This again, is in keeping with the patterns found in similar assemblages (Foard 2012, 69) and with the military tactics of the period (Weller 1966, 50-56; Peachey 1992, 27; Turton and Peachey 1996, 3-10). Table 3 shows a summary of the total number and weight of all the lead finds in each of the 39 fields, plus the split between likely cavalry and Table 2: Breakdown of the likely weapon types based on the size of the lead shot and therefore whether they are from cavalry or infantry Page 55 of 81 infantry shot using the graph produced in Figure 4. Table 3: Summary of number and weight of all lead artefacts from each field 2.2 Figure 12. Graph of calibre of balls and probable weapon type, showing weight at 1 gram intervals (created by author) Page 56 of 81 Methodology and Analysis of the Location Data As previously mentioned, there has been some debate over the precise location of the battlefield. Although it was traditionally thought to have taken place in Cheriton Wood and between the North Ridge and Central Ridge, Adair places the battlefield further south, between the Central Ridge and South Ridge (1969, 141; 1973, 195-197). The report by Bonsall (2007) revealed that some of the battle must have taken place further north than Adair suggests, but as it only assesses the finds from a single field it cannot be used to accurately pinpoint a location for the battle. Until now, all theories about the site of the Battle of Cheriton have come from deductive reasoning based on the landscape and the written historical evidence. Figure 13: Example of a map from the McGovern notes collection, showing the individual finds spots but no labels to identify location or orientation (photograph by author) As part of the analysis, the written notes and annotated maps made by James and Michael McGovern during their metaldetecting were also studied, with the hope that they might be able to provide details of the location of each find so that a spatial distribution map could be produced, similar to that created for the Battle of Edgehill. However, the collection of notes did not provide enough information to be able to accurately plot individual spatial distribution for the entire site. Only a handful of the maps and documentation showed individual finds locations, but as seen in the example in Figure 5 some of these were unusable as they provided no identifiable marks. Although the entire area appears to have been extensively covered over the 20 years of metal detecting, there does not appear to be a systematic method to the detecting, leaving the possibility that there may be areas that have not been surveyed or have been only partially surveyed. Amongst the notes were a series of letters and documents relating to other metallic finds recovered from the area, such as a hoard of gold staters. Whilst not directly relevant to the Civil War material, these documents were beneficial in helping to identify the relevant field names, along with historical and modern maps and aerial photographs which were also used to identify the field names. One of the letters penned by James McGovern also provided a valuable piece of information: James and Michael McGovern had an agreement with all the local landowners to exclude any other metal-detectors from their land. Although it has not been possible to produce detailed spatial distribution maps showing the scatter of individual finds, such as those produced for Edgehill, the notes did offer details of the field names and the coverage of the area, and since all the finds were presented in boxes and bags labelled with the field they came from it is still possible to extract some location and spatial distribution data from the assemblage. Using the field names, the extent of the battlefield area can now be determined (Figure 6). Although this map may not show the full extent of the battle ground, since it is possible there are finds missing from the collection, the presence of Civil War artefacts in this area suggests that the battle extended at least as far as these field boundaries. As the new map shows, this area extends beyond the current registered battlefield boundary and some way beyond the Page 57 of 81 limits of the traditional battle site. More significantly, the new battlefield area is considerably bigger than the area suggested by Adair and there are no Civil War artefacts in the collection found in the southern half of Adair’s battlefield. Figure 14. Map of the Cheriton battlefield showing the new extent of the site based on the finds analysis, including all the named fields containing Civil War artefacts (created by author) Using both the historical evidence available and the results of the location analysis, it is finally possible to gain better insight into how the battle unfolded. Although not as accurate as the individual lead shot spatial distribution maps such as those produced from the Battle of Edgehill analysis, it is still possible to show distribution of finds across the battlefield. Figure 7 shows the distribution of all lead shot by field, with the darker colours showing a higher concentration of finds. This distribution map clearly shows the areas of concentrated fighting: Long Barrow Field on the Central Ridge; Middle Farm II in the valley between the two ridges; and Flat Bottoms, Middle Hazzard Field, Dark Copse Field, and Scrubbs Copse on the North Ridge. As this map and Table 3 show, Long Barrow Field has the highest concentration of lead finds at 766, significantly more compared to the next largest amount: Flat Bottoms with 439. This would suggest that Long Barrow Field was the site of some of the fiercest fighting during the battle, with a large part of the battle also taking part across the North Ridge. Additional maps show the distribution of musket balls (Figure 8) and pistol/carbine shot (Figure 9) and presents a similar pattern in terms of concentration of finds as the map in Figure 7, again suggesting that the areas around Long Barrow Field and the North Ridge were in the thick of the action. Page 58 of 81 Figure 15. Map of the battlefield showing the distribution of all lead finds by number per field (created by author) Figure 16. Map of the battlefield showing the distribution of musket balls per field and therefore the likely spread of infantry fire (created by author) Page 59 of 81 Figure 17. Map of the battlefield showing the distribution of pistol and carbine shot per field and therefore the likely spread of cavalry fire (created by author) DISCUSSION This analysis has provided a great deal of new information for the interpretation of the Battle of Cheriton. Of particular importance are the new maps showing the location and size of the battlefield. These maps may not show the full extent of the battleground, as it is possible there are finds missing from the collection, yet the presence of Civil War artefacts in this area suggests that the battle extended at least as far as these field boundaries: extending beyond the current registered battlefield boundary and some way beyond the limits of the traditional battle site. More notably, the new battlefield area is considerably bigger than the area suggested by Adair and there are no Civil War artefacts in the collection found in the southern half of Adair’s battlefield. Based on the results of this analysis, supported by the work of Bonsall (2007), it is reasonable to conclude that Adair’s theory of the battle taking place within the area between the South Ridge and Central Ridge can now be considered to be incorrect. In addition, as the area of the battle is now known, the potential for protection of the battlefield can be considered further. The fields of Cheriton are currently all agricultural land belonging to the three farms in the area: North End Farm, Middle Farm, and Scrubbs Copse Farm. Whilst these fields continue to be used for agricultural purposes it is unlikely that they will be built upon, but as Cheriton is one of just five Civil War battlefields that remain wholly undeveloped (Foard and Morris 2012, 182; Battlefields Trust 2016) some form of protection should be considered to prevent any future development. Page 60 of 81 Figure 18. New interpretation of the events of the battle based on the finds: 1) The Parliamentarians arrayed on the South Ridge attempt to take Cheriton Wood but 2) are beaten back onto the Central Ridge by the Royalists positioned on the North Ridge, 3) the Royalists launch a cavalry attack on the Parliamentarians left flank along either Dark Lane or Broad Lane, 4) fierce fighting takes place on the Central Ridge as the Parliamentarian infantry fight off repeated attacks, 5) having fended off the Royalist Cavalry the Parliamentarians launch a counter-attack on the Royalists forces, 6) the Royalist line collapses and the army, now in disarray, turn and retreat along Scrubbs Lane towards Alresford (created by author) The analysis of the spread of the lead artefacts means that the action of the Battle of Cheriton can be examined for accuracy. The data and the historical documentary evidence suggest that the accepted description of the events of the battle is correct, but the location of these events can be called into question. Figure 10 presents a new interpretation of the events of the battle. Key to this new interpretation is the location of the illfated Royalist cavalry charge. Originally thought to have been along Bramdean Lane, next to Cheriton Wood, the evidence now suggests that this cavalry charge is more likely to have been further to the west, either using Page 61 of 81 Dark Lane or Broad Lane. There are no dramatic differences in the amount of cavalry shot found in the fields around these three lanes (Figure 9), but the concentration of finds in Long Barrow Field suggests that Dark Lane or Broad Lane is a more likely route for the Royalist cavalry, the cavalry charge bringing about the fiercest fighting. It is also possible to suggest that, after being routed from Cheriton Wood early in the day, Waller moved his troops north-west from their starting position on the South Ridge onto the Central Ridge, thereby occupying a more commanding position of the battlefield. This supports the charge levelled at Hopton by some historians of failing to press home the advantage once Cheriton Wood had been taken by the Royalists, allowing Waller to reform (Burne 1950, 399; Adair 1973, 128; Spring 1997, 16; Halsall 2002, 46). It would also give partial support to Adair’s interpretation of the battle which places the Parliamentarian army on the South Ridge (Adair 1973, 125). There are, however, a few anomalies found in this analysis. The foremost of these is the absence of artillery evidence: only three artillery shot were recorded in the analysis. Artillery ammunition of this period would be lead balls similar in size to musket balls, which were packed into the cannon and fired in a shotgun effect, resulting in a hexagonal shape to each shot resulting from compression during firing. Both the historical evidence (Adair 1969, 144; 1973, 109; Kinross 1979, 111; Spring 1997, 13; Wanklyn 2014, 98) and tactics of the day (Peachey 1992, 20-21; Turton and Peachey 1993, 12; Foard 2012, 87) suggest that artillery was present at the Battle of Cheriton, yet there is very little archaeological evidence in this analysis to support their use. One theory for this is simply inexperience: the initial training received prior to the carrying out the study was more focused on the recording of musket balls and carbine and pistol shot. As such, the absence of artillery shot could be due to a failure to correctly identify them. However, the previous archaeological survey carried out on Dark Copse Field also failed to identify any artillery shot other than a single cannon ball (Bonsall 2007, 34). An alternative theory is that the shot were simply discarded during recovery by the detectorists. Again however, this scenario is unlikely as the McGoverns were diligent in their collection (if not their recording) and even the most disfigured lead pieces were recovered. The absence of artillery shot could be explained by the artillery being present but not used at the battle. Peachey (1992) states that the artillery presence was often low in number, and ‘it seems they were often either too late to reach the field [or] became left behind on the field…as the army advanced or manoeuvred’ (1992, 21). This may also apply to Cheriton. Many sources state that the day started off with a heavy mist (Adair 1969, 140; 1973, 126; Emberton 1995, 102; Spring 1997, 15; Wanklyn 2014, 96), making the use of artillery impractical. This would also apply to the first action of the day which took place in Cheriton Wood: any artillery that was fired to the wood would not have been recovered as part of the McGovern collection as Cheriton Wood does not appear to have been surveyed. The main action in the open fields started with the ill-fated cavalry charge on the Parliamentarians left flank, which may have happened too quickly for the artillery to be repositioned to deal with this attack. A further systematic survey of the battlefield and a more detailed statistical analysis on the shape of the balls in the collection may shed further light on this irregularity. Another anomaly is in the potential inadequacy of the survey, highlighted especially by the three unnamed fields north of Cheriton Wood which appear to contain no Civil War finds (Figure 7). This, along with the incompleteness of the notes and maps, suggests that either there are more finds and notes belonging to the McGoverns that have yet to be revealed or that the area was not as extensively surveyed as thought. A further detailed methodical site survey could therefore be carried out. As mentioned previously, it appears the McGoverns had exclusive access to metal-detect on these fields, implying that any areas that were not surveyed, or incompletely surveyed or recorded, are unlikely to have been disturbed by other metal-detectorists during the time of the investigations. There is also no evidence of re-enactments being carried out on the fields during this time, another factor which can impact data results. A comprehensive and systematic survey of the entire area would ensure that the battlefield site has been fully covered. If the finds are recorded correctly using GPS, this could also result in a further spatial analysis of the finds distribution, using any new finds recovered during the survey and using the examples where individual locations have been provided by the McGoverns’ maps and notes. A detailed spatial analysis could provide a more detailed interpretation of the action and events of the battle. This study of Cheriton is therefore by no means complete: there is certainly potential for further research that could be carried out on the collection. The assemblage itself could also be subject to further examination. Page 62 of 81 With almost 3000 lead artefacts, the Cheriton collection is one of the largest complete collections recovered from a Civil War site and could therefore yield a great deal of information not just about the battle, but also about the characteristics of lead ammunition of this period. An analysis of the impact damage to the lead shot could be carried out: only 39% of the shot analysed showed impact damage of some kind. This supports the trend shown in Bonsall’s study of the finds from Dark Copse Field (2007, 38) and a study of the impact damage could provide further insight into the effects of impact on lead shot. This could also be used to examine the reports of a frantic large-scale Royalist retreat: the lack of impact damage would suggest that a large number of shot was abandoned or misfired during the retreat (Bonsall 2007, 38). Three-dimensional laser scanning, piloted on the Bosworth collection, can also be used for the recording of the geometry and surface attributes of the lead shot to examine the finer detail of surface striations and smelting (Foard and Morris 2012, 69). This innovative new technique is still in the early stages of use in battlefield archaeology and so could be used to great effect with the amount of lead shot available in the Cheriton collection. Then there is the study of the construction of the lead shot. Although both armies would have carried plenty of supplies of ammunition, some of the musket balls and pistol shot would have been made on site, either the night before or possibly during the battle. Therefore, it may be possible to study the characteristics of each shot relating to its construction, to identify if the shot was made professionally or whether it was made on the eve of battle, and how the shot itself was created. This could have a wider impact on the study of warfare in general, highlighting the difference between the historical ‘reactive’ aspect of battle, where the site of conflict is chosen based on circumstance, and the modern orchestrated conflicts, such as the Battle of the Somme, where the battle was planned down to the hour of attack and so ammunition and supplies were prepared in advance (Keegan 1976, 196; 1993, 312-313). There are also the non-lead artefacts that are available for study. As mentioned in the methodology, these were not included in this study to enable the focus to be on the lead finds, but the non-lead finds could have significance as well. Amongst these were a small number of badly corroded iron plates and horseshoes, which could potentially represent armour and cavalry. However, these also could just be agricultural depositions. A further analysis may be able to differentiate them. Also in the non-lead artefacts were five bone fragments, believed to be human finger bones and part of a shin bone. The shin bone appeared to present with cut marks. The bones were found in Long Barrow Field, so named for the long barrow that sits in the southern end of the field. As already shown by the artefacts, this field is also the site of the heaviest fighting in the battle, thus suggesting that the largest number of fatalities would have been in this field. It is not an improbable theory then to suggest that the long barrow was used as a makeshift mass grave for the dead, since previous research has shown that existing landscape features are often used when digging mass graves on battle sites (Sutherland and Holst 2005, 29; Foard and Morris 2012, 32-34). If these bones do indeed belong to a Civil War casualty and indicate the presence of a mass grave, this would be a major discovery for battlefield archaeology in this country: although burial sites have been suggested at Naseby, Edgehill and Newbury, to date no mass graves have been found and excavated at any English Civil War battlefield site (Foard and Morris 2012, 30). The immediate step that should be taken next, however, is to ensure these results are shared with the public, in particular, the local populace of Cheriton itself. Archaeological research should be carried out for the benefit of all, and ‘it is the duty of the archaeologist, as of the scientist, to reach and impress the public’ (Wheeler 1954, 196). This piece of research has brought about a better understanding of the Battle of Cheriton and a new interpretation for the events of the battle, and as such it is important that piece of local history is returned to the community, whether that be to update the information boards dotted around the site, or for the landowners to understand the need for cultural heritage protection. The Battle of Cheriton artefact collection, and the site itself, remain a wealth of information waiting for detailed analysis that one day may bring Cheriton the recognition that it deserves, both as an archaeological and historical example and as a pivotal battle in one of the bloodiest and most important conflicts this country has ever engaged in. REFERENCES Ackroyd, Peter. 2014. The History of England, Volume III: Civil War. London: Macmillan. Adair, John. 1969. Roundhead General: A Military Biography of Sir William Waller. London: MacDonald. Page 63 of 81 Adair, John. 1973. 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Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military. Weller, J. 1966. Weapons and Tactics: Hastings to Berlin. London: Nicolas Vane. Wheeler, R. E. M. 1954. Archaeology from the Earth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Page 65 of 81 Page 81 of 81